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National and international R&D support programmes and technology scouting in 
European small and medium enterprises 
Abstract
Purpose: This study evaluates the effectiveness of national and international R&D support 
programmes on firms' technology scouting, defined as firms' use of external knowledge 
sources. 
Design/methodology/approach: Drawing on a unique dataset on R&D support programmes 
for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) operating in both manufacturing and service 
sectors across 28 European countries, this study reports treatment effects estimated by a copula-
based endogenous switching model, which takes into account unobserved firm heterogeneity. 
Findings: Empirical results indicate that R&D support programmes have heterogeneous effects 
on technology scouting. In particular, a crowding out effect arises in the case of informal 
sources of external knowledge, while additional effects are reported for formal, strategic 
sources. 
Practical implications: For informal sources of external knowledge, a random distribution of 
R&D measures would have a substantially larger effect rather than using current selection 
criteria. 
Originality/value: This is among first studies to explore the policy effects on technology 
scouting applying a copula-based endogenous switching model. Most cross-sectional empirical 
studies employ matching estimators, although their main disadvantage is the selection on 
observables.
Keywords: Technology scouting, Behavioural additionality; External knowledge search, 
European SMEs, copula-based endogenous switching model 
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1. Introduction 
Innovation policy has taken centre stage among policy makers in the European Union 
(EU) (Edler et al., 2012). A new EU strategy for economic growth and employment - Europe 
2020 - defines one of its priorities as a sustainable growth through knowledge and innovation 
(European Commission, 2010). To foster research and innovation-led growth, the European 
Commission designed Horizon 2020, the 2014-2020 Framework Programmes for Research and 
Technological Development (CLORA, 2013). Innovation activities supported by Horizon 2020 
encompass not only traditional, technological (product and process) innovations but also non-
technological (marketing and organisational) innovations and a demand-driven innovation 
(European Commission, 2013a).
Another relevant feature of Horizon 2020 is attention dedicated to small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs), through policy instruments that will aim to support development, 
growth and internationalization of SMEs (European Commission, 2013b). Small and medium-
sized enterprises are the engine of growth in the European economy, contributing to 
employment with 66.5 per cent of all European jobs in 2012 and gross value added at 57.6 per 
cent (European Commission, 2013b). Innovation is one of the critical activities through which 
small and medium sized enterprises contribute to increased employment, economic growth and 
development. 
Policy makers not only recognize the importance of innovation and its public support, 
but increasingly recognize the relevance of evaluating the impact of support measures (Dimos 
and Pugh, 2016; Edler et al., 2012; Gök and Edler, 2012). Consequently, policy makers and 
scholars are interested in evaluating the effectiveness of public subsidies, that is, if public 
support enhances firms’ innovation activities. Evaluation of public innovation support attempts 
to answer this question through qualitative evaluation (including case studies and interviews) 
and through quantitative evaluation using econometric evaluation models and techniques. 
Referring to this latter approach, key research questions pertain as to whether public support 
measures induce larger investment in R&D, relative to firms' private funding (input 
additionality); larger innovation output, such as the introduction of technological and non-
technological innovations (output additionality); and, whether policy instruments establish 
changes in firms' innovative behaviour (behavioural additionality) (Antonioli and Marzucchi, 
2012; Busom and Fernández-Ribas, 2008; Cerulli, 2010; Falk, 2007; Clarysse et al,, 2009; Gök 
and Edler, 2012; Marzucchi et al., 2015). In general, if public support measures have a positive 
impact on the above innovation indicators, it is interpreted as additionality effect, i.e. public 
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funding is a complement to firms' private innovation activities. On the contrary, if public 
support measures are ineffective, public funding crowds out (substitutes) firms' innovation 
activities (David et al., 2000; Gök and Edler, 2012; Radicic et al., 2016). It is worth noting that 
the effectiveness of public support is an econometric issue, as theoretically, either effect is 
plausible (David et al., 2000; Dimos and Pugh, 2016). 
Our study evaluates the effectiveness of R&D support programmes on firms’ 
technology scouting (i.e. the use of external knowledge sources), thus fitting into the category 
of behavioural additionality studies. Moreover, very few evaluation studies examine the 
effectiveness of public innovation programmes across countries. This study aims to contribute 
to filling this gap by examining the impact of national and international R&D support 
programmes on European SMEs. In addition, our key contribution is associated with the 
empirical strategy employed in this study. This is among first study to explore the policy effects 
on technology scouting applying a copula-based endogenous switching model. Most cross-
sectional empirical studies employ matching estimators, although their main disadvantage is 
the selection on observables, i.e. unobserved firm characteristics cannot be taken into account, 
thus raising an issue of robustness of empirical findings to unobserved heterogeneity. Unlike 
matching estimators, an endogenous switching model (also known as a Roy model or tobit 5 
type model, Hasebe, 2013) controls for both observed and unobserved firm characteristics. 
Additionally, another contribution of our study is related to the estimated treatment 
parameters. Namely, most evaluation studies report the average treatment effect on the treated 
(ATT), without considering an issue of potential misallocation of public funding. That is, by 
estimating the average treatment effect (ATE), and by comparing it to the ATT, we can 
conclude whether public support could be more effective if randomly distributed among firms 
(in which case, the ATE would be larger than the ATT, as the ATE, by definition, represents 
the treatment effect had public support been distributed among random population of firms) 
(Radicic et al., 2016). 
The reminder of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature 
review of empirical studies exploring behavioural additionality. Section 3 describes the data 
and the empirical strategy. Section 4 discusses the empirical results, while Section 5 present 
main conclusions and policy implications drawn from the empirical analysis. 
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2. Literature review 
2.1 Theoretical framework 
The traditional or neo-classical approach to public support of technology and 
innovation is based on the theory of market failures. Other approaches are those of evolutionary 
economics and systems of innovation, which focus on system failures. System failure and 
market failure approaches are not mutually exclusive, but rather complement each other (Smits, 
2002). Market failures refer to inefficient allocation of goods and services in a market due to 
externalities, asymmetric information, non-competitive markets, uncertainty and risk, 
appropriability issues, indivisibility of knowledge generation, imperfect capital markets and 
missing markets for high-risk investments (Arrow, 1962). From the late 1950s onwards, the 
market failure rationale has provided a basis for public innovation policies (Schrӧter, 2009). 
The evolutionary approach of system failures has been developed since the 1990s as a 
corollary of the development of evolutionary economics and of a resource-based, evolutionary 
theory of the firm (Smits, 2002). The systems of innovation approach regards innovation as an 
interactive, non-linear process characterized by reciprocity and feedback mechanism between 
economic actors in the innovation system. The central mechanism in the system is interaction 
(i.e. cooperation and interactive learning) between firms and other, private and public, actors 
(Antonioli and Marzucchi, 2012; Wanzenböck et al., 2013; Woolthuis et al., 2005). However, 
the systems of innovation is not the only theoretical framework that emphasizes the role of 
interactions on firm innovation performance. The concept of open innovation focuses on firms’ 
use of inflows and outflows of knowledge in enhancing their innovation performance 
(Chesbrough, 2003, 2006). As modern firms do not innovate in isolation, they interact with 
their external environment by searching and exploiting external knowledge, as well as by 
allowing other firms to exploit the knowledge developed within the focal firm. 
Among a large number of system failures, three are particularly relevant for justifying 
public intervention with respect to behavioural additionality. Those are strong network failures 
(when firms miss to identify new opportunities because of existing strong links with other 
actors in the system), weak network failures (arising when firms interact with other economic 
actors at a suboptimal level), and capability failures (when firms, in particular SMEs, lack 
technological and organizational capabilities to learn and consequently struggle to adapt to new 
technological developments) (Knockaert et al., 2014; Woolthuis et al., 2005). From the 
perspective of system failures, the role of innovation policy is to increase firms’ knowledge 
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and innovation capacity (if failures are at the firm level) or to increase institutions’ capacity in 
addressing systems failures (if they appear at the institutional, system level) (Antonioli and 
Marzucchi, 2012; Gök and Edler, 2012; Wanzenböck et al., 2013). The focus in our study is 
on a firm-level analysis. Consequently, we explore whether innovation policy induces firms to 
increase their use of external knowledge sources, which in turn, will expand their knowledge 
and innovation capacity (Wanzenböck et al., 2013).
 With respect to different types of additionality effects, input additionality and output 
additionality arise from the traditional or neo-classical market failure rationale, while a broader 
concept of behavioural additionality has emerged from the evolutionary, system failure 
rationale. Following Knockaert et al. (2014), behavioural additionality includes scope 
additionality, acceleration additionality and cognitive capacity additionality. Scope and 
acceleration additionalities refer to the expansion and speed up of innovation activities 
respectively as a result of public support. Cognitive capacity additionality encompasses 
network and competence additionalities, which occur when new networks and partnerships are 
created. These new linkages result in interorganizational learning which expands firms’ 
competences. We hereby focus on cognitive capacity additionality. As this type of behavioural 
additionality is further divided into two distinct (network and competence) additionalities, we 
need to clarify which is the focus of our study. Knockaert et al. (2014) relate cognitive capacity 
additionality to the concept of external search depth and breadth (Laursen and Salter, 2006), 
which is termed inbound open innovation in the literature on open innovation. While the former 
is associated with the number of external knowledge sources, the latter emphasises the intensity 
of external knowledge linkages. Knockaert et al. (2014) argue that competence additionality is 
linked to search depth, whereas network additionality relates to search breadth. Our study 
focuses on individual knowledge sources and the impact of public support on the probability 
of their use. Therefore, our empirical findings are associated with network additionality, 
although the theoretical argument from the systems of innovation approach suggest that new 
linkages facilitate interorganizational learning which, in turn, might increases firms’ 
competencies.
Public support can result in network additionality for several reasons. First, the 
literature on open innovation points out to the role of absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990) in firms’ interactions with the external environment. Namely, to explore external 
knowledge sources, firms need to possess an internal knowledge base which enables firms to 
explore, identify and exploit knowledge outside of their organizational boundaries. Therefore, 
by receiving public support, firms can expand their absorptive capacity, which, in turn, allows 
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them to open up their innovation activities more extensively. A positive impact of public 
support on absorptive capacity is particularly relevant in the context of SMEs, given their 
limited financial and human resources (Radicic and Pugh, 2017). Second, public support can 
provide incentives for cooperation for innovation. From the perspective of system failures, the 
failures include the increasing costs of accessing external knowledge, lack of experience in 
technology scouting, and risks and uncertainties associated with the projects in which external 
knowledge will be exploited (Lucena and Afcha, 2014). Given that interactive learning is the 
prominent element of the innovation system, public support for innovation can promote 
knowledge exchange between actors in the system (Knockaert et al., 2014). In other words, the 
role of public support would be to mitigate system failures at the firm level by encouraging 
firms to interact with their environment and thus access external knowledge, which, in turn, 
would expand their learning capabilities and internal knowledge base (Antonioli and 
Marzucchi, 2012; Wanzenböck et al., 2013). Again, this is particularly relevant for SMEs, as 
they often lack managerial skills, competences and experience necessary for establishing and 
maintaining successful networks (Radicic et al., 2018). 
2.2 Review of empirical evidence on network additionality 
Compared to a large number of empirical studies on input additionality and to a lesser 
extent on output additionality (for a review see Dimos and Pugh, 2016), behavioural 
additionality has been the subject of only a few studies (Bellucci et al., 2019; Radicic et al., 
2018). An interesting feature of the empirical analysis of behavioural additionality is that 
matching estimators are the only estimation methods that have been employed. The reason for 
this is associated with impediments imposed by the data at hand. Innovation studies, in general, 
mostly report empirical findings from the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) datasets. The 
main issues with this large-scale survey are twofold: first, the survey is not longitudinal by 
design, which typically precludes panel analysis; and, second, other evaluation methods, such 
as selection models and Instrumental Variable (IV) approaches require a valid instrument, 
which is hard if not impossible to find in the CIS surveys (Busom and Fernández -Ribas, 2008). 
Among the first studies investigating behavioural additionality is Fier et al. (2006), who 
assessed the impact of public support on innovative behaviour of German firms in 
manufacturing sectors. Behavioural additionality is measured by three types of cooperation: 
with other businesses; with scientific institutions; and a combination of both. The results from 
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matching estimation on the third and fourth CIS datasets are positive for all three types of 
cooperation. Moreover, the results indicate the heterogeneity of the impact; the largest effect 
of public support is on combined cooperation, and the smallest on cooperation with other 
businesses. 
Busom and Fernández-Ribas (2008) used a subsample of Spanish manufacturing firms 
participating in the CIS survey in 1999 to explore the impact of national support programmes 
on vertical cooperation (with suppliers and customers) and with private-public partnerships 
(cooperation with universities or public laboratories). National programmes have a positive 
effect on both types of cooperation, but the effect on private-public partnership is more 
prominent; the policy effect on this type of partnership is twice the effect on vertical 
cooperation. 
In the context of Spanish firms, Fernández - Ribas and Shapira (2009) investigate how 
local and national support programmes affect cooperation with international partners among 
manufacturing firms in Catalonia. The authors use the third CIS survey covering the period 
1998 -2000. The estimated ATT is positive, but fairly small (8 percentage points). Furthermore, 
Afcha- Chàvez (2011) explores behavioural additionality using the Spanish ESEE survey of 
business strategy for the period 1998-2005. The treatment effects are estimated for vertical 
cooperation and private-public partnerships while separating regional from national 
programmes. Estimated programme effects are significantly positive only for private-public 
cooperation for both sources of funding, but not significant for vertical cooperation. 
Antonioli et al. (2014) investigate the impact of a specific regional innovation policy 
(PRRITT) in the Italian region of Emilia-Romagna. The results are contrary to previous studies 
– the authors report no effect of public support on regional cooperation. Furthermore, regional 
policy shows a negative effect on horizontal cooperation. In summary, most studies report 
behavioural additionality, i.e. a positive impact of public support on firms' cooperation. 
However, the magnitude and significance vary depending on sources of funding and types of 
cooperative partners. 
Ahn et al. (2020) examine the effectiveness of public support on cooperation in Korean 
manufacturing firms. Their empirical findings indicate a non-linear effect of R&D subsidies 
on cooperation. That is, the impact follows an inverted U-shaped curve, which means that 
subsidies have a positive effect on firms’ propensity to cooperate when the amount of subsidies 
is low, while the effect decreases for highly funded firms. 
There are few studies reporting the effectiveness of innovation policy on SME innovative 
behaviour. Radicic et al. (2018) explore the propensity of this category of firms in traditional 
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manufacturing industries to cooperate for innovation with other firms and external knowledge 
providers. Empirical results from seven EU regions suggest that public support does not 
promote cooperation with competitors, marginally promote cooperation with customers and 
suppliers and strongly promote cooperation with knowledge providers. Finally, Orlic et al. 
(2019) focus on the effectiveness of innovation policy in six Western Balkan countries. While 
empirical results indicate no evidence of input and output additionality in Western Balkan’s 
SMEs, innovation policy has a positive impact on firms’ innovative behaviour. 
3. Methodology  
3.1 Model specification 
Our main hypothesis is that SMEs participating in R&D support programmes would 
show on average a significantly higher propensity to use specific approaches to external 
knowledge than non-participating firms. Our treatment variables are constructed as binary 
variables equal to 1 if a firm participated in national R&D programmes, and zero otherwise 
(variable National participation) and equal to 1 if a firm participated in international R&D 
programmes and zero otherwise (variable International participation). Regarding outcome 
variables, the dataset contains information on the six different approaches to acquiring external 
knowledge: 
- Informal networking with other firms;
- Informal networking with research organizations;
- Strategic alliances with other firms;
- Non-equity alliances with other firms (a type of alliance that is not based on formal 
economic return for either party); 
- Participation in innovation networks, S&T parks, clusters, etc.; and
- Customer involvement (i.e. close involvement of customers in idea generation/concept 
development). 
Each approach to acquiring external knowledge is measured on a five-point scale (from 
'Don't apply at all' to 'Apply expensively'). Based on the scale, binary indicators were created 
for each source, where the indicator is equal to 0 if the firm reports either of three categories 
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('Do not apply at all'; 'Do not apply'; or 'Neutral') and is equal to 1 if the firm reports either 
'Apply' or 'Apply extensively' for a particular source of external knowledge.
Firms usually engage in formal cooperation or networking through contractual 
agreements to avoid the risks of knowledge leakage and partners’ opportunistic behaviour.  In 
contrast, if firms do not want to incur costs and face limitations associated with contractual 
agreements, they can engage in informal, noncontractual networking relations. This type of 
collaboratio  relies on mutual trust and allows firms to exchange tacit knowledge (Huang and 
Rice 2009; Radicic and Pugh, 2017). However, a downside to informal networking is that firms 
face the risks of knowledge leakage and partners’ opportunistic behaviour, as they are not 
protected by contractual agreements (Radicic et al., 2019). Furthermore, according to Van de 
Vrande et al. (2009), SMEs often engage in informal networking, because this type of 
networking relationships does not require substantial financial resources, which are, besides 
limited human resources, major constraints in SME innovation activities. Our dataset contains 
information on two types of informal networking (with other firms and with research 
organization) as sources of external knowledge. 
A further source of external knowledge included in the analysed survey is that of 
strategic alliances. Following Narula and Hagedoorn (1999), strategic alliances are formal 
cooperative agreements focused on long-term profit optimisation. Given their limited financial 
resources, SMEs are less likely to forge strategic alliances than large firms. Moreover, the 
resource-based view suggests that SMEs are hampered by the lack of managerial resources and 
competences, which can be another reason why these firms would struggle to form and 
maintain strategic alliances (Radicic and Pugh, 2017). However, if SMEs engage in this type 
of cooperation, its impact on SME performance and innovativeness is positive (Lee et al., 
2010).
In addition, our dataset contains information on non-equity alliances, defined as a type 
of alliance that is not based on formal economic return for either party. For this reason, non-
equity alliances are characterized by coopetition, whereby partners simultaneously cooperate 
and maintain a certain degree of competitiveness (Radicic and Pugh, 2017). According to 
Hagedoorn (2002), firms in high-tech and ICT sectors are more likely to forge this type of 
cooperative agreements, than firms in medium and low-tech industries.  
Firms participate in innovation networks to benefit from knowledge exchange with 
other firms, public agencies and research organizations in close vicinity (similar to clusters). 
The aim of knowledge exchange in innovation networks is knowledge creation for economic 
gain (Radicic and Pugh, 2017). Like with informal types of cooperation, mutual trust is a 
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necessary condition for firms to participate in innovation networks, which enables them to 
exchange often tacit knowledge (Pinto et al., 2015). However, geographical proximity might 
have a negative effect on firms’ innovation activities if lock-in effects occur (Boschma, 2005). 
The final source of external knowledge in our survey is customer involvement. Using 
customers as external knowledge source can be highly beneficial for firms’ innovativeness, 
specifically in developing new products and technologies (Fitjar and Rodriguez-Pose, 2013), 
as it might improve market share and product credibility as well as reduce costs associated with 
introducing new products (Radicic et al., 2019). However, too much reliance on customer 
knowledge can be detrimental as firms might be inclined to focus on incremental changes rather 
than engage in more radical types of innovation (Laursen, 2011). Customer involvement in 
firms’ innovation activities is in particular suited for SMEs, given their limited financial and 
human resources (Parida et al., 2012; Radicic and Pugh, 2017). 
After discussing our variables of interest (i.e. technology scouting or the use of external 
knowledge sources), next we look at control variables that are grouped into three categories: 
those measuring firms' absorptive capacity; those controlling for firm characteristics; and those 
controlling for external, environmental (external) influences. Absorptive capacity plays a key 
role in firms’ ability to search and absorb external knowledge (Ahn et al., 2020; Chapman et 
al., 2018). It is usually measured by internal R&D activities, proxied by several measures: 
internal (intramural) R&D expenditures; the share of R&D personnel; and the presence of a 
separate R&D department (Spithoven et al., 2010). Our dataset contains information on each 
measure, but the variable measuring R&D expenditures (R&D expenditure) represents total 
R&D expenditures, thus including the following categories: R&D staff salaries; contracts to 
outside R&D performers; acquisition of machinery, equipment and software; purchase of 
patents and know-how from other organizations; training in R&D; and, market introduction of 
innovations. Having a separate R&D department is measured as a binary variable (=1 if a firm 
has a separate R&D department; 0 otherwise; R&D department). However, the variable 
measuring R&D expenditures (R&D expenditure) is highly correlated with the variable 
measuring the share of R&D personnel (the correlation coefficient is 0.79), suggesting a 
potential problem with multicollinearity if both variables were to enter the model (Greene, 
2008). Hence, the model specification includes only the former, because it is a broader measure 
of innovation input. We also included a binary variable R&D strategy equal to 1 if the firm has 
defined a R&D and innovation strategy for the next five years (zero otherwise). 
Regarding firm characteristics, we control for a firm's degree of internationalization by 
including a binary indicator that is equal to 1 if a firm undertakes exporting activities (Export). 
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Exporting firms tend to have more incentive to innovate as a result of competitive pressure on 
international markets (Busom and Fernández-Ribas, 2008; Parida et al., 2012). SMEs are a 
heterogeneous group of firms; correspondingly, we created three binary indicators for micro 
firms with less than 10 employees (Micro firms), small firms having between 10 and 49 
employees (Small firms) and medium-sized firms having between 50 and 249 employees 
(Medium firms). Moreover, the model includes two variables to control for firm-level "quasi" 
fixed effects (or initial conditions). The first variable (Relative capacity) is equal to 1 if firms 
report that their research and innovation record was leading compared to other firms in the 
industry five years prior to the survey (zero otherwise). The second variable (Resources for 
innovation) is equal to 1 if firms report having devoted fewer resources to innovation five years 
prior to the survey (zero otherwise). 
Our model also takes into account environmental factors, such as competitive pressure, 
industry characteristics, and whether firms operate in technology parks and integrate 
technology platforms. Competitive intensity is measured as a binary indicator, equal to 1 if a 
firm reported that the competition is strong in its main markets (zero otherwise) (Competition). 
Furthermore, the model includes two binary indicators for firms located in technology parks 
(Tech. parks), and for those that integrate a cluster/technology platform (Tech. platform). 
Finally, we control for sectoral heterogeneity by constructing six industry categories following 
NACE classification: high tech; medium high tech; medium low tech; low tech; Information 
and Communication Technology (ICT); and services (as the base category).
3.2 Data
The dataset used in the analysis was gathered in 2010 within the MAPEER project 
commissioned by the European Commission’s DG-Research.1 The survey questionnaire 
covered the period 2005-2010. The sample includes 763 SMEs from 28 European countries. 
The survey was targeted at the population of SMEs with less than 250 employees and an annual 
turnover of less than 50 million Euros (EU definition of SMEs - Article 2 of the Annex of 
Recommendation 2003/361/EC) (European Commission, 2005). Within the group, micro-sized 
firms are defined as those with less than 10 employees, small firms with 10 or more and less 
than 50 employees and medium-sized firms with 50 or more and less than 250 employees. The 
1 The description of and information about the project are given on 
https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/93511/factsheet/en and https://www.strast.cz/en/projects/projects-
list/mapeer-sme.
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sample consists of 376 micro firms, 242 small firms and 145 medium-sized firms. Given the 
small number of firms from individual countries, we grouped them into four categories 
following the European Innovation Scoreboard (European Commission, 2011). The categories 
are as follows (for variable construction and descriptive statistics see Table A.1):
 'Innovation leaders', countries whose innovation performance is well above the 
EU27 average. Our sample consists of 146 SMEs operating in countries from this 
category. 
 'Innovation followers', countries with performance close to the EU27 average 
(219 firms in our sample; this is the base or reference category); 
 'Moderate innovators', countries whose performance is below that of the EU27 
average (284 firms in the sample); and
 'Modest innovators', representing countries whose performance is well below that 
of the EU27 average (114 firms in the sample). 
Grimpe and Sofka (2008) control for heterogeneity in national innovation systems by 
grouping 13 EU countries on the basis of their total national R&D expenditure (GERD) as a 
share of each countries' GPD. For a robustness check, they grouped countries based on the 
share of firms performing R&D on a continuous basis. We opted to control for distinct national 
innovation systems based on both innovation inputs and outputs, and not just on innovation 
inputs (such as R&D expenditure).
Table A1 in the appendix shows the variable description and summary statistics for the 
treatment and outcome variables, as well as for control variables. Half of the surveyed SMEs 
(53.2 per cent) participated in national/regional R&D programmes in the period covered by the 
survey, while less than a third of firms (30.3 per cent) received public support from 
international sources. Regarding the use of external knowledge sources, the largest number of 
firms (62.5 per cent) utilizes informal networks with other firms as a source of external 
knowledge, followed by customer involvement (59 per cent of firms), informal networks with 
research organizations (52.6 per cent) and strategic alliances with other firms (44.9 per cent). 
The least practiced networking activity is non-equity alliances with other firms (24.9 per cent). 
With regards to firm characteristics, the modal group of SMEs’ reported total R&D 
expenditures as a percentage of total expenditure is the range of 11 to 20 per cent, two-thirds 
of firms are exporters (67.9 per cent), and a similar proportion of SMEs reports a highly 
competitive intensity (61.3 per cent). Moreover, 41.4 per cent of firms have a separate R&D 
department, while half of the sample firms have a defined R&D and innovation strategy for the 
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period 2010-2015. Less than a third of firms are located in technology parks/areas and have 
integrated a technology platform (23.6 and 24.5 per cent respectively). Finally, concerning 
firms’ innovative capacity, 44.4 per cent of firms reported to have devoted fewer resources to 
innovation five years prior to the survey, while 23.5 per cent of firms reported to have had a 
leading innovation capacity relative to their competitors. 
3.3 Empirical strategy 
Measuring the impact of a treatment includes economic agents (firms, households, and 
individuals), potential outcomes and treatment. We will refer to firms in our further discussion. 
If we denote Ti to be treatment (Ti =1 if a firm i received a treatment and Ti=0 if not) and Yi (Ti) 
for outcomes of firms i = 1,..., N, where N is the total population of firms, Yi(1) is the outcome 
of treated firms, Yi(0) is the outcome of treated firms without a treatment, and ∆i is a treatment 
effect for a firm i, then
∆𝑖 = 𝑌𝑖(1) ― 𝑌𝑖(0) (1)
Equation 1 points to the fundamental evaluation problem. To evaluate the impact of a 
treatment, both outcomes with and without treatment should be simultaneously observed. 
Therefore, the outcome for treated firms had it not been treated (counterfactual outcome - Yi(0)) 
cannot be observed and has to be estimated, which implies that the treatment effect itself cannot 
be observed and must be estimated (Aakvik et al., 2005).  
Further, two effects are usually estimated in the evaluation literature. The average 
treatment effect (ATE) indicates the difference in outcome between two counterfactuals: the 
outcomes for all firms if they were to be treated, Y(1)  (e.g. by programme participation); and 
the outcomes for all firms if they were not to be treated, Y(0). As not all firms are treated and 
not all firms are untreated, both Y(1) and Y(0) are counterfactuals that have to be estimated. 
𝐴𝑇𝐸 = 𝐸[𝑌(1) ― 𝑌(0)] (2)
The average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) indicates the difference in outcomes 
of the treated firms with and without treatment and can be written as:
𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸[𝑌(1)│𝑇 = 1] ― 𝐸[𝑌(0)|𝑇 = 1] (3)
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The second term  in Equation 3 is the expected outcome had treated 𝐸[𝑌(0)|𝑇 = 1]
firms not receive a treatment. This is a counterfactual outcome that is not observed. If the 
unconditional outcome of non-treated firms is taken to estimate the counterfactual outcome, 
then that would lead to selection bias, as treated and non-treated firms may differ even before 
a treatment assignment (Aakvik et al., 2005). The problem of selection bias can be solved by 
imposing certain identifying assumptions, which will be further discussed in Section 3.3. Thus, 
evaluation methods are designed to take into account the estimation of counterfactual outcomes 
as well as to control for selection bias. David et al. (2000) in their review of the evaluation 
innovation studies, pointed out that public support in a domain of R&D and innovation should 
be treated as endogenous, given two sources of selection bias usually pertinent to the selection 
process: first, firms self-select themselves into public support programmes, and second, 
managers in public agencies adopt a 'picking the winner' strategy (see e.g. Antonelli and Crespi, 
2013), that is, select those firms that are more likely to succeed in their innovation activities. 
Finally, the average treatment on untreated (ATU) estimates the effect of a programme 
on the firms who did not receive public support and can be written as:
𝐴𝑇𝑈 = 𝐸[𝑌(1)│𝑇 = 0] ― 𝐸[𝑌(0)|𝑇 = 0] (4)
The first term  in Equation 4 is the expected outcome had untreated firms 𝐸[𝑌(1)|𝑇 = 0]
received a treatment. This is a counterfactual outcome that is not observed in the case of ATU.
The three treatment parameters (ATT, ATU, ATE) are linked as follows:
              𝐴𝑇𝐸 = 𝐴𝑇𝑇 ∗ 𝑝(𝑇 = 1) +𝐴𝑇𝑈 ∗ 𝑝(𝑇 = 0)                    (5)
Where p(T=1) is the probability of being treated, and p(T=0) is the probability of being 
untreated (Cerulli, 2014).
The treatment parameters are obtained by estimating a copula-based endogenous 
switching model. The model has two equations: Equation 6 is the outcome equation, which 
estimates the probability of firms using external sources of knowledge conditional on both 
other influences on the usage of external knowledge and the probability of participating in a 
support programme; and Equation 7 is the selection equation, which models the participation 
decision, that is, the probability that a firm will participate in a public R&D programme.
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𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒_𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖 = 𝐶1 + 𝛽𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛾𝑍𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 (6)
𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 = 𝐶2 + 𝜆𝑍𝑖 + 𝜃𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  (7)
Where subscript i indexes each firm in the sample 1…n, where n is the number of firms; C1 
and C2 represent the intercept in equations 1 and 2 respectively; the β coefficient measures the 
effect of programme participation; the γ and  coefficients measure the effects of control 
variables commonly identified in the literature (firm size, market power, exporting activities 
etc.) on the use of knowledge sources and the participation in R&D programmes, respectively; 
the k1   vector contains coefficients that measure the participation effects of a 1k vector of 
indicators of firms’ views on factors promoting or impeding programme participation 
(Obstacle), which are the anticipated identifying variables; and u and  are the error terms, 
which capture the unobserved influences on the respective dependent variables. Full definitions 
and descriptive statistics for each variable are presented in Table A1 in appendix.
The independent variables must include (for econometric reasons) all the control 
variables from the outcome equation 6 together with at least one variable to identify equation 
7. This identifying variable (Obstacle) must influence the programme participation decision 
but not the probability of using external knowledge sourcing. For this purpose, the survey 
included a question related only to programme participation whereby firms were asked about 
SME needs in general: “Which would you say are the specific needs for SMEs in order to 
participate in R&D programmes??” In all 22 parts of this question, the corresponding indicator 
variable was defined as 1 if the response was “Very high importance” and 0 otherwise (“No 
importance”, “Low importance”, “Important” or "High importance"). However, only few of 
these variables were used as exclusion restrictions (see Table A1 for their description and 
summary statistics).
We constructed Equation 6 to test the hypothesis that whether or not a firm use a 
particular form of technology scouting depends on whether or not the firm participates in R&D 
programme. This makes Participation a switching variable: if the firm participated in R&D 
programme (Participation = 1), then it enters a state in which the use of knowledge source is 
hypothesised to be more likely (Regime 1); if the firm did not participate in R&D programme 
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(Participation = 0) then the firm remains in a state less conducive to using a particular 
knowledge source (Regime 0).2
Because the outcome variable, Knowledge_source, can exist in one of two regimes, 
Equation 6 should be estimated over both regimes 1 and 0, in which case Participation 
disappears as a separately estimated variable. Instead of the single Equation 6, we now have 
two equations, 6a and 6b, differentiated by an additional subscript: 1 for Regime 1 (for which 
Participatio  = 1); and 0 for Regime 0 (for which Participation = 0).
Regime 1 (Participation =1)
𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒_𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖1 = 𝐶11 + 𝛾1𝑍𝑖1 + 𝑢𝑖1 (6a)
Regime 0 (Participation =0)
𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒_𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖0 = 𝐶10 + 𝛾0𝑍𝑖0 + 𝑢𝑖0 (6b)
This switching process is endogenous if unobserved influences on Knowledge_source 
(ui1 in equation 6a and ui0 in equation 6b) are correlated with unobserved influences on 
Participation (εi in equation 7). In this three-equation model (7, 6a and 6b), a bivariate outcome 
(Knowledge_source) is partitioned into two regimes by a potentially endogenous bivariate 
switching variable (Participation). The three equations are linked by both common observed 
variables and, potentially, by common unobserved variables.  
The estimated switching probit model can be used to generate counterfactual 
probabilities of acquiring external knowledge for firms in different regimes of participation 
(Lokshin and Glinskaya, 2009). In turn, these probabilities are used for the calculation of the 
average treatment effects of the treated (ATTs), the average treatment effects on the untreated 
(ATUs) and the average treatment effects (ATEs). As our main focus is not the interpretation 
of the estimated coefficients, but rather the interpretation and a comparison of the estimated 
treatment effects, the results of the estimated switching probit models are presented in the 
appendix Tables A3 and A4 for national R&D programmes, and Tables A5 and A6 for 
international programmes. 
2 Firms responded to the questions: “Did you participate in national / regional R&D programmes in the last 5 
years? and “Did you participate in international R&D programmes in the last 5 years?”. The limitation of the 
corresponding Participation variable is that we lack information on the level of support. This limitation is shared 
with the EU’s Community Innovation Survey (CIS). 
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The original implementation of the endogenous switching model relies on the strong 
assumption of joint normality of the error terms (Aakvik et al., 2005). Consequently, if the 
normality assumption does not hold, the estimates will be inconsistent. To relax the normality 
assumption in sample selection models, Smith (2003) applied the copula approach, which 
allows different types of joint distribution in error terms between the outcome and the selection 
equations (Hasebe, 2013). Moreover, another advantage is that the copula method allows the 
model to be estimated via the maximum likelihood method, which means that the estimates are 
efficient (Hasebe, 2013). A copula represents a joint distribution function that binds together 
marginal distributions of the error terms in the selection and the outcome equations, although 
the copula itself is independent of marginal distributions (Smith, 2003). In our analysis, we 
have considered a range of copulas: Gaussian, Frank, Plackett, Clayton, AMH, FGM, Joe, and 
Gumbel (for detailed discussion see Smith, 2003; Trivedi and Zimmer, 2005; Hasebe, 2013). 
In each of the estimated models reported below, the preferred copula was determined using the 
Vuong test together with the AIC and BIC information criteria. The former evaluates the 
contribution of each copula to the log likelihood, such that the copula with the highest 
contribution is preferred (Hasebe, 2013). In addition, the smallest AIC or BIC suggests the 
preferred copula (Smith, 2003; Hasebe, 2013).
Finally, the selection equation (Equation 7) should include all independent variables 
from the outcome equation (Equation 6) together with at least one additional, identifying 
variable. Identification restrictions are imposed on the model by including variables that 
influence the participation decision, but do not directly affect the use of external knowledge 
sources. The survey questionnaire for the MAPEER project included questions related only to 
programme participation. Specifically, the question that served as an exclusion restriction in 
our model was in relation to SME needs in general: “Which would you say are the specific 
needs for SMEs in order to participate in R&D programmes?”. In all 22 parts of this question, 
the corresponding indicator variable was defined as 1 if the response was 'Most important' and 
0 otherwise ('Not important at all', 'Not important', 'Neutral' or 'Important'). For each estimated 
model, the selection equation included only those parts of the relevant question that were 
statistically significant in the selection equation and insignificant in the outcome equation.
4. Empirical results 
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The correlation matrix shown in Table A2 in the appendix indicates no issues with 
multicollinearity between the independent variables. For evaluating the impact of programme 
participation on firms' innovative behaviour, we estimated three treatment parameters - the 
average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), the average treatment effect on the untreated 
(ATU), and the average treatment effect (ATE). Estimated treatment effects for each model are 
presented in Table 1 (for national R&D programmes) and in Table 2 (for international R&D 
programmes). In all models, the likelihood-ratio (LR) tests reject the null hypothesis of the 
independence of the error terms in the outcome and the selection models (columns 3 in both 
tables) (Hasebe, 2013). 
The estimated treatment effects shown in Table 1 are rather heterogeneous across 
different outcome variables. A participation in national R&D programmes increases the 
probability of the use of informal networking with other firms by programme participants by 
6.4 percentage points (p.p.) but would have increased this probability for firms randomly 
selected from the entire population by 17.3 p.p. Receiving national support increases the 
probability of the use of informal networking with research organizations by 12.7 p.p. and 
would have increased the probability for firms randomly selected from the entire population 
by 12.7 p.p. Thus, in the case of this type of external knowledge source, there is no difference 
between the estimated ATT and ATE. In contrast, receiving national support increases the 
likelihood of using strategic and non-equity alliances as external knowledge sources by 2.3 p.p. 
and 14.2 p.p. respectively, while the estimated ATEs in both cases are smaller than the ATTs 
(and the difference is statistically significant at the 1% level).3 Likewise, concerning SMEs’ 
participation in innovation networks, receiving national R&D programmes increases its 
probability by 13.5 p.p., while a random distribution of the programmes would have increased 
the likelihood by 8.4 p.p. Finally, the treated firms are less likely to use customers as the 
knowledge sources by 6.6 p.p., while a random distribution of national R&D support would 
have not resulted in a significant treatment effect. The overall pattern that can be inferred from 
these results on the effectiveness of national R&D programmes is that ATT is larger than ATE 
when SMEs use formal knowledge sources, while the opposite holds for informal sources. 
With regards to policy effects of international R&D programmes shown in Table 2, the 
first interesting finding is that this source of support produces heterogenous effects on 
technology scouting, similar to national R&D programmes. More precisely, receiving 
international support increases the probability of using informal networking with research 
3 As explained in notes to Tables 1 and 2, when ATT>ATE, then ATU<ATT and vice versa (see equation 5).
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organizations (by 24 p.p.), the use of strategic alliances (by 15.4 p.p.), the use of non-equity 
alliances (by 21.8 p.p.), participation in innovation networks (by 16.8 p.p.) and the use of 
customers (by 16.4 p.p.).
The second interesting finding refers to the relationship between ATT and ATE. 
International R&D programmes yield larger ATT than ATE for the use of formal scouting, 
while the pattern is reverse in the case of informal scouting. Accordingly, with respect to the 
relationship between ATT and ATE, results are consistent for both national and international 
R&D programmes. 
Page 19 of 35 Journal of Science and Technology Policy in China
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Science and Technology Policy Management
20
Table 1. National support - the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), the average treatment effect on the untreated (ATU) and 
the average treatment effect (ATE) 
Outcome variable Copula LR test of independence
ATT 
(n=315)
ATU
(n=277)
ATE 
(n=592)
Relation between 
ATT & ATE
Informal networking with other 
firms AMH p = 0.000
0.064***
(0.012)
0.295***
(0.013)
0.173***
(0.007) ATT<ATE ***
Informal networking with 
research organizations Frank p = 0.011
0.127***
(0.009)
0.128***
(0.009)
0.127***
(0.006) ATT=ATE 
Strategic alliances with other 
firms Frank p = 0.018
0.023**
(0.011)
-0.041***
(0.010)
-0.007
(0.007) ATT>ATE ***
Non-equity alliances with other 
firms Plackett p = 0.000
0.142***
(0.013)
-0.127***
(0.014)
0.017**
(0.008) ATT>ATE ***
Participation in innovation 
networks, S&T parks, clusters 
etc.
Frank p = 0.000 0.135***(0.011)
0.025***
(0.012)
0.084***
(0.007) ATT>ATE ***
Close involvement of 
customers in idea generation 
and concept development 
Frank p = 0.002 -0.066***(0.012)
0.096***
(0.012)
0.011
(0.009) ATT<ATE ***
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Bootstrapped standard errors, 1,000 replications. When ATT>ATE, then ATT>ATU (see formula 5) and vice versa. In the third 
scenario when ATT=ATE, then ATT=ATU. 
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Table 2. International support - the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), the average treatment effect on the untreated (ATU) 
and the average treatment effect (ATE) 
Outcome variable Copula LR test of independence
ATT 
(n=178)
ATU
(n=410)
ATE 
(n=588)
Relation between 
ATT & ATE
Informal networking with other 
firms AMH p = 0.000
-0.080***
(0.016)
0.168***
(0.013)
0.092***
(0.009) ATT<ATE ***
Informal networking with 
research organizations Joe p = 0.001
0.240***
(0.012)
0.410***
(0.009)
0.358***
(0.008) ATT<ATE ***
Strategic alliances with other 
firms AMH p = 0.000
0.154***
(0.016)
0.085***
(0.011)
0.106***
(0.009) ATT>ATE ***
Non-equity alliances with other 
firms Frank p = 0.000
0.218***
(0.017)
0.042***
(0.011)
0.096***
(0.008) ATT>ATE ***
Participation in innovation 
networks, S&T parks, clusters 
etc.
AMH p = 0.000 0.168***(0.017)
0.073***
(0.010)
0.103***
(0.008) ATT>ATE ***
Close involvement of 
customers in idea generation 
and concept development
Joe p = 0.003 0.164***(0.019)
0.167***
(0.012)
0.166***
(0.010) ATT=ATE
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Bootstrapped standard errors, 1,000 replications. When ATT>ATE, then ATT>ATU (see formula 5) and vice versa. In the third 
scenario when ATT=ATE, then ATT=ATU. 
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5. Conclusions and policy implications
This study reports the impact of national and international R&D programmes on 
behavioural additionality in European SMEs, in particular, focusing on technology scouting. 
While receiving national R&D programmes increases the likelihood of using strategic and non-
equity alliances as the knowledge source, receiving international R&D programmes also 
stimulates informal networking with research organizations and the use of customers. 
Besides reporting the policy effects on treated firms, our analysis also provides the 
estimates of policy effects had R&D programmes been randomly allocated. Analysing each 
source of external knowledge separately, the results suggest that a random distribution of 
national R&D support measures would increase the probability of using informal networking 
with other and customer involvement to a larger degree than the distribution using current 
selection criteria. In the case of using informal networking with research organisations, random 
allocation would yield the same effect as the current selection process. This pattern is 
reinforced in the case of a random allocation of international R&D programmes, that is, random 
allocation of international R&D programmes would increase the likelihood of using informal 
networking (with both other firms and research organisations), whereas the current selection 
process would be more beneficial when firms use formal sources of knowledge. Customer 
involvement would benefit to the same extent whether support is randomly allocated or not. 
Therefore, the overall results seem to indicate that, for the use of informal sources of external 
knowledge, a random distribution of R&D measures would have a substantially larger effect – 
even if only by reducing crowding out – rather than using current selection criteria. The 
opposite is found for the use of formal, strategic knowledge sources. That is, random allocation 
would not yield a larger policy effect compared to a conventional selection process. 
This study makes two contributions to the literature. First, it explores behavioural 
additionality applying the empirical strategy that takes into account both observed and 
unobserved heterogeneity. Our results suggest that public support measure might not have an 
additionality effect among surveyed firms. Namely, national public support measures crowd 
out SMEs’ use of customers as a source of external knowledge, while international support 
crowds out the use of informal networking with other firms.  
Second, the study reports the ATEs and compares it to the ATTs to identify potential 
misallocation of public funding, and thus suggesting potential improvements with that respect. 
By randomly allocating public funding, public agencies could increase the effectiveness of 
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public support measures on firms' acquisition of informal external knowledge. Current 
selection criteria should remain in place for the purpose of fostering formal use of knowledge 
sources. Therefore, for informal technology scouting, a larger behavioural additionality among 
European SMEs might be achieved with a lottery system of public funding distribution (Radicic 
et al., 2016). These results could be explained by looking at the differences between formal 
and informal technology scouting. The former entails large costs and contractual obligations, 
while the latter is based on mutual trust and is a less costly form of scouting.  Consequently, 
current selection criteria are effective in supporting firms that engage in formal technology 
scouting, whereas random allocation would benefit SMEs when they use informal knowledge 
sources. 
Another important issue should be mentioned. Although we did not separately analyse 
developed and developing/emerging economies, our policy recommendation concerning 
random allocation could be particularly relevant for less developed economies. Specifically, a 
selection process in less developed countries is more likely to be hampered by information 
asymmetry and bureaucratic incompetence (Wang et al., 2017). In the case of a random 
allocation of public funds, these potentially limiting factors would have no effect on the 
distribution of public funds, as the selection process would be randomized. 
The practical implementation of random allocation is divided into three stages: 
application, screening, and lottery. The first stage includes firms submitting their application 
form. Applicants are screened for eligibility or “due diligence” checking, which ensures that 
participating firms meet eligibility requirements – e.g. with respect to proposed activities and 
solvency. Finally, eligible proposals are randomly selected for support.
Consistent with these proposals, the case for random allocation is gaining influence 
amongst policy makers trough randomised controlled trials (RTC) projects. For instance, the 
SME innovation voucher programme in the Netherlands was implemented such that vouchers 
were allocated by lottery. Cornet et al. (2006) evaluated the effectiveness of this programme 
and found that firms used eight (out of 10) vouchers for their innovation activities, which would 
not have been happen without public support. This is a rather large additional effect given that 
evaluation studies usually report positive, but small policy effects (Dimos and Pugh, 2016; 
Radicic et al, 2016). Furthermore, since 2010, five publicly funded randomised controlled trials 
(RCT) projects have been undertaken in the UK designed to explore the effectiveness of public 
support on innovation in small firms (for more details about each project, see Roper, 2018). As 
an illustration, the first RCT project is called “Creative Credits”, which is a voucher programme 
with random allocation to support SME purchases of creative services. A short-run evaluation 
Page 23 of 35 Journal of Science and Technology Policy in China
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Science and Technology Policy M
anagem
ent
24
of the programme has shown a positive and large policy effect of the use of creative services 
on SME innovation activities (Bakhshi et al., 2011).
Although our study provides new insights into behavioural additionality, future 
research might explore how public support measures affect firms' innovative behaviour in 
medium and long run, which would require the availability of longitudinal data (Ahn et al., 
2020; Radicic et al., 2019). Furthermore, other types of behavioural additionality (such as 
cognitive capacity additionality, see e.g. Knockaert et al., 2014) could be explored. Finally, 
gathering and analysing information on the selection process could be a fruitful avenue for 
further exploration of the effectiveness of public funding (Antonelli and Crespi, 2013).
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Appendix 
Table A1. Variable definition and descriptive statistics
Variables Variable construction
Mean 
(standard 
deviation)
Treatment variables 
National participation DV=1 if a firm participated in national/regional R&D programmes in the last five years; zero otherwise
0.532
(0.499)
International participation DV=1 if a firm participated in international R&D programmes in the last five years; zero otherwise
0.303
(0.460)
Outcome variables – use of external knowledge 
Informal networking with other firms
DV=1 if the response was 'Apply' or 'Apply extensively'; =0 if 'Don't apply at all', 
'Don't apply' or 'Neutral' to the question "Do you have a specific approach towards 
acquiring external knowledge - Informal networking with other firms"
0.625
(0.485)
Informal networking with research organizations 
DV=1 if the response was 'Apply' or 'Apply extensively'; =0 if 'Don't apply at all', 
'Don't apply' or 'Neutral' to the question "Do you have a specific approach towards 
acquiring external knowledge - Informal networking with research organizations"
0.526
(0.500)
Strategic alliances with other firms 
DV=1 if the response was 'Apply' or 'Apply extensively'; =0 if 'Don't apply at all', 
'Don't apply' or 'Neutral' to the question "Do you have a specific approach towards 
acquiring external knowledge - Strategic alliances with other firms"
0.449
(0.498)
Non-equity alliances with other firms
DV=1 if the response was 'Apply' or 'Apply extensively'; =0 if 'Don't apply at all', 
'Don't apply' or 'Neutral' to the question "Do you have a specific approach towards 
acquiring external knowledge - Non-equity alliances with other firms"
0.249
(0.433)
Participation in innovation networks, S&T parks, 
clusters etc.
DV=1 if the response was 'Apply' or 'Apply extensively'; =0 if 'Don't apply at all', 
'Don't apply' or 'Neutral' to the question "Do you have a specific approach towards 
acquiring external knowledge - Participation in innovation networks, S&T parks, 
clusters etc."
0.408
(0.492)
Close involvement of customers in idea generation 
and concept development 
DV=1 if the response was 'Apply' or 'Apply extensively'; =0 if 'Don't apply at all', 
'Don't apply' or 'Neutral' to the question "Do you have a specific approach towards 
acquiring external knowledge - Close involvement of end users/customers in idea 
generation/concept development"
0.590
(0.492)
Control variables 
R&D expenditure
Annual R&D expenditures as % of total expenditure (including both intramural and 
extramural R&D activities; purchase of patents and know-how; training in R&D; 
and market introduction of innovation) =1 if the share is 0-10 %;  =2 if the share is 
11-20%; =3 if the share is 21-50 %; =4 if the share is >50%
2.064
(1.132)
Export Geographic markets where firms sell goods or services, DV=1 if a firm engages in 0.679
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exporting activities; zero otherwise (0.467)
Competition DV = 1 if a firm responded ‘Very strong’ to the question “How would you judge the competition in your main market(s)”; otherwise 0
0.613
(0.487)
R&D department DV=1 if a firm has a separate R&D department; zero otherwise 0.414(0.493)
R&D strategy DV=1 if a firm has developed R&D and innovation strategy for the next five years; zero otherwise 
0.505
(0.500)
Resources for innovation DV = 1 if the response was 'Fewer' to the question “Resources devoted by the firm to innovation compared to the present”; = 0 if 'About the same' or 'More'
0.444
(0.497)
Relative capacity
DV = 1 the response was 'Leading' to the question “The firm’s research and 
innovation record relative to other firms in their industry in 2005”; = 0 if 'Average' 
and 'Lagging'
0.235
(0.424)
Tech. park DV=1 if a firm is located in a technology park/area; zero otherwise 0.236(0.425)
Tech. platform DV=1 if a firm integrates a technology platform; zero otherwise 0.245(0.430)
Transparent proposal evaluation procedures
DV=1 if a firm responded ‘Most important’ to the question “Which would you say 
are the specific needs for SMEs in order to participate in R&D programmes? – 
Transparent proposal evaluation procedures; zero otherwise
0.432
(0.496)
Simple reporting requirements
DV=1 if a firm responded ‘Most important’ to the question “Which would you say 
are the specific needs for SMEs in order to participate in R&D programmes? – 
Simple reporting requirements; zero otherwise
0.448
(0.498)
Adequate networks of potential partners
DV=1 if a firm responded ‘Most important’ to the question “Which would you say 
are the specific needs for SMEs in order to participate in R&D programmes? – 
Adequate networks of potential partners; zero otherwise
0.260
(0.439)
Adequate marketing of programmes
DV=1 if a firm responded ‘Most important’ to the question “Which would you say 
are the specific needs for SMEs in order to participate in R&D programmes? – 
Adequate marketing of programmes; zero otherwise
0.240
(0.427)
Micro firms DV=1 if a firm has less than 10 employees; zero otherwise 0.478(0.500)
Small firms DV=1 if a firm has more than then 10 but less than 50 employees; zero otherwise 0.333(0.472)
Medium-sized firms DV=1 if a firm has more than then 50 but less than 250 employees; zero otherwise
0.189
(0.392)
Innovation leaders DV=1 if countries are Denmark, Finland, Germany and Sweden; zero otherwise 0.172(0.378)
Innovation followers
DV=1 if countries are Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, France, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Slovenia and the United Kingdom; zero otherwise (base 
category)
0.298
(0.457)
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Moderate innovators DV=1 if countries are Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain; zero otherwise
0.407
(0.492)
Modest innovators DV=1 if countries are Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Bosnia and Herzegovina; zero otherwise 
0.123
(0.329)
High-technology industries DV=1 if firms operate in high-technology intensive industries; zero otherwise (NACE classification rev 1.1)
0.198
(0.399)
Medium high-technology industries DV=1 if firms operate in medium high-technology intensive industries; zero otherwise
0.130
(0.337)
Medium low-technology industries DV=1 if firms operate in medium low-technology intensive industries; zero otherwise 
0.128
(0.335)
Low-technology industries DV=1 if firms operate in low-technology intensive industries; zero otherwise 0.142(0.349)
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) 
industries DV=1 if firms operate in ICT industries; zero otherwise 
0.211
(0.408)
Service sectors DV=1 if firms operate in service industries; zero otherwise (base category) 0.191(0.393)
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Table A.2. The correlation matrix
Independent 
variables
R&D 
expenditure Export Competition
Relative 
capacity
Resources 
for 
innovation
R& D 
strategy
R&D 
department
Tech. 
park
R&D 
expenditure 1
Export 0.164*** 1
Competition -0.108** 0.004 1
Relative 
capacity 0.282
*** 0.116*** -0.092** 1
Resources 
for 
innovation
0.030 -0.019 0.145*** -0.102** 1
R&D 
strategy 0.328
*** 0.144*** -0.037 0.142*** 0.124*** 1
R&D 
department 0.322
*** 0.203*** 0.019 0.093** 0.112*** 0.358*** 1
Tech, park 0.320*** 0.093** -0.121*** 0.142*** -0.002 0.122*** 0.097** 1
Tech. 
platform 0.193
*** 0.072* 0.065 0.018 0.202*** 0.179*** 0.143*** 0.228***
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
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Table A3. Results from the copula approach for national R&D programmes – part 1
Independent variables Selection equation
Outcome 
equation 
regime 0
Outcome 
equation 
regime 1
Selection 
equation
Outcome 
equation 
regime 0
Outcome 
equation 
regime 1
Selection 
equation
Outcome 
equation 
regime 0
Outcome 
equation 
regime 1
R&D expenditure 0.191*** 0.021 -0.002 0.195*** 0.059* 0.014 0.194*** 0.065* 0.024
(0.065) (0.036) (0.027) (0.066) (0.032) (0.027) (0.066) (0.034) (0.029)
Export 0.174 0.116* 0.076 0.182 0.124** 0.022 0.185 0.047 0.024
(0.128) (0.065) (0.065) (0.129) (0.057) (0.065) (0.129) (0.060) (0.065)
Competition -0.275** -0.052 0.024 -0.260** -0.079 0.044 -0.251** -0.113* 0.009
(0.119) (0.062) (0.053) (0.120) (0.059) (0.053) (0.120) (0.060) (0.055)
Resources for innovation 0.045 0.035 -0.025 0.017 0.145* 0.092 0.031 0.098 0.043
(0.144) (0.080) (0.059) (0.146) (0.081) (0.058) (0.147) (0.080) (0.063)
Relative capacity 0.371*** 0.112* 0.004 0.352*** 0.082 0.040 0.361*** 0.077 0.108*
(0.122) (0.066) (0.052) (0.121) (0.060) (0.052) (0.121) (0.063) (0.055)
R&D strategy 0.419*** 0.005 0.132** 0.418*** 0.193*** 0.229*** 0.425*** 0.220*** 0.213***
(0.122) (0.072) (0.056) (0.124) (0.067) (0.057) (0.122) (0.068) (0.059)
R&D department 0.309** -0.106 0.034 0.313** -0.112 0.055 0.314** 0.027 -0.048
(0.134) (0.071) (0.057) (0.136) (0.070) (0.057) (0.136) (0.074) (0.061)
Small firms 0.467*** -0.019 -0.075 0.456*** 0.070 0.005 0.460*** -0.146** 0.028
(0.136) (0.072) (0.059) (0.136) (0.067) (0.058) (0.137) (0.062) (0.065)
Medium firms 0.327** -0.065 0.002 0.332** -0.054 0.008 0.337** -0.105 -0.062
(0.166) (0.091) (0.073) (0.168) (0.079) (0.075) (0.168) (0.084) (0.078)
Tech. park 0.042 -0.068 -0.017 0.050 0.004 -0.043 0.051 0.007 0.041
(0.163) (0.082) (0.069) (0.166) (0.080) (0.066) (0.166) (0.076) (0.075)
Tech. platform 0.098 -0.112 0.072 0.108 0.171** 0.081 0.121 0.038 0.168***
(0.148) (0.083) (0.060) (0.148) (0.078) (0.057) (0.147) (0.080) (0.062)
Simple reporting 
requirements 0.256** 0.273** 0.279**
(0.120) (0.122) (0.122)
Adequate marketing of 
programmes -0.330** -0.329** -0.367**
(0.141) (0.143) (0.144)
Constant -1.422*** 0.454*** 0.582*** -1.440*** 0.199** 0.300*** -1.450*** 0.331*** 0.259**
(0.223) (0.102) (0.112) (0.230) (0.093) (0.115) (0.230) (0.095) (0.118)
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Industry and country dummies are included but not reported. 
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Table A4. Results from the copula approach for national R&D programmes – part 2
Independent variables Selection equation
Outcome 
equation 
regime 0
Outcome 
equation 
regime 1
Selection 
equation
Outcome 
equation 
regime 0
Outcome 
equation 
regime 1
R&D expenditure 0.198*** -0.002 0.009 0.195*** 0.021 0.018
(0.065) (0.028) (0.024) (0.066) (0.033) (0.029)
Export 0.184 0.009 0.022 0.181 0.088* -0.096
(0.129) (0.050) (0.053) (0.129) (0.051) (0.070)
Competition -0.253** 0.043 0.054 -0.258** -0.019 -0.034
(0.120) (0.049) (0.047) (0.119) (0.054) (0.056)
Resources for innovation 0.027 0.091 -0.039 0.030 0.127* -0.021
(0.147) (0.067) (0.056) (0.146) (0.076) (0.066)
Relative capacity 0.365*** 0.132** 0.104** 0.356*** 0.056 0.050
(0.122) (0.053) (0.047) (0.121) (0.056) (0.059)
R&D strategy 0.426*** 0.129** 0.034 0.412*** 0.149** 0.034
(0.122) (0.055) (0.053) (0.122) (0.066) (0.059)
R&D department 0.325** -0.017 0.017 0.318** -0.027 0.096
(0.137) (0.060) (0.055) (0.134) (0.068) (0.064)
Small firms 0.452*** -0.087 -0.150*** 0.466*** -0.062 -0.002
(0.139) (0.053) (0.055) (0.136) (0.062) (0.063)
Medium firms 0.329* -0.019 -0.113 0.345** -0.101 -0.027
(0.171) (0.073) (0.071) (0.167) (0.068) (0.082)
Tech. park 0.039 0.049 -0.034 0.054 0.045 0.089
(0.169) (0.072) (0.066) (0.166) (0.080) (0.072)
Tech. platform 0.131 0.064 0.100* 0.102 0.238*** 0.247***
(0.149) (0.065) (0.055) (0.147) (0.081) (0.064)
Simple reporting 
requirements 0.305** 0.309**
(0.123) (0.125)
Adequate marketing of 
programmes -0.379*** -0.353**
(0.140) (0.139)
Constant -1.421*** 0.131* 0.389*** -1.458*** 0.153* 0.525***
(0.229) (0.073) (0.101) (0.232) (0.083) (0.119)
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Industry and country dummies are included but not reported. 
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Table A5. Results from the copula approach for international R&D programmes – part 1
Independent variables Selection equation
Outcome 
equation 
regime 0
Outcome 
equation 
regime 1
Selection 
equation
Outcome 
equation 
regime 0
Outcome 
equation 
regime 1
Selection 
equation
Outcome 
equation 
regime 0
Outcome 
equation 
regime 1
R&D expenditure 0.329*** -0.015 0.052 0.343*** 0.012 -0.010 0.341*** 0.064** -0.019
(0.069) (0.028) (0.039) (0.070) (0.031) (0.038) (0.070) (0.027) (0.039)
Export 0.370*** 0.062 0.174* 0.372*** 0.082 -0.016 0.392*** 0.052 0.013
(0.140) (0.053) (0.090) (0.144) (0.055) (0.086) (0.144) (0.048) (0.087)
Competition 0.087 -0.046 0.017 0.092 -0.027 -0.053 0.109 -0.061 -0.027
(0.129) (0.048) (0.074) (0.132) (0.047) (0.078) (0.130) (0.047) (0.078)
Resources for innovation 0.369** -0.023 -0.078 0.405*** 0.094 0.021 0.368** 0.043 0.104
(0.149) (0.060) (0.072) (0.150) (0.067) (0.074) (0.144) (0.063) (0.076)
Relative capacity 0.156 0.076 -0.064 0.158 0.065 0.011 0.130 0.102** 0.048
(0.128) (0.049) (0.072) (0.128) (0.047) (0.069) (0.128) (0.047) (0.075)
R&D strategy 0.301** 0.114** -0.007 0.277* 0.258*** 0.032 0.280** 0.209*** 0.153*
(0.136) (0.053) (0.070) (0.144) (0.071) (0.070) (0.136) (0.051) (0.082)
R&D department -0.185 -0.005 0.053 -0.221 0.010 0.032 -0.202 -0.062 0.107
(0.138) (0.058) (0.072) (0.139) (0.058) (0.068) (0.139) (0.058) (0.076)
Small firms 0.548*** -0.110* 0.135* 0.624*** -0.010 0.047 0.627*** -0.091* 0.064
(0.154) (0.059) (0.076) (0.148) (0.061) (0.072) (0.148) (0.053) (0.087)
Medium firms 0.717*** -0.055 -0.028 0.788*** -0.080 -0.046 0.762*** -0.039 -0.260**
(0.188) (0.073) (0.102) (0.190) (0.069) (0.093) (0.190) (0.071) (0.101)
Tech. park -0.186 -0.017 -0.051 -0.151 0.018 -0.046 -0.152 -0.013 0.107
(0.171) (0.065) (0.092) (0.176) (0.065) (0.086) (0.173) (0.063) (0.095)
Tech. platform 0.055 -0.036 0.135* 0.088 0.102* 0.139** 0.023 0.107* 0.180**
(0.150) (0.062) (0.072) (0.152) (0.062) (0.064) (0.152) (0.064) (0.077)
Transparent evaluation 
procedures 0.301** 0.333** 0.341***
(0.130) (0.135) (0.127)
Adequate networks of 
potential partners 0.524*** 0.454*** 0.419***
(0.142) (0.147) (0.141)
Adequate marketing of
programmes -0.580*** -0.653*** -0.614***
(0.159) (0.157) (0.154)
Constant -2.039*** 0.541*** 0.372** -2.179*** 0.190** 0.715*** -2.111*** 0.304*** 0.284*
(0.276) (0.090) (0.162) (0.278) (0.079) (0.145) (0.279) (0.087) (0.152)
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Industry and country dummies are included but not reported. 
Page 34 of 35Journal of Science and Technology Policy in China
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Science and Technology Policy M
anagem
ent
35
Table A6. Results from the copula approach for international R&D programmes – part 2
Independent variables Selection equation
Outcome 
equation 
regime 0
Outcome 
equation 
regime 1
Selection 
equation
Outcome 
equation 
regime 0
Outcome 
equation 
regime 1
R&D expenditure 0.338*** 0.033 -0.026 0.332*** 0.062** -0.031
(0.069) (0.022) (0.034) (0.069) (0.027) (0.042)
Export 0.387*** 0.031 0.007 0.376*** 0.053 -0.107
(0.142) (0.042) (0.076) (0.142) (0.048) (0.096)
Competition 0.100 0.084** -0.010 0.108 -0.044 -0.023
(0.128) (0.039) (0.071) (0.128) (0.045) (0.079)
Resources for innovation 0.367** 0.041 -0.034 0.372** 0.068 0.033
(0.143) (0.056) (0.073) (0.145) (0.060) (0.084)
Relative capacity 0.127 0.134*** 0.096 0.132 0.096** 0.019
(0.129) (0.042) (0.069) (0.129) (0.045) (0.077)
R&D strategy 0.284** 0.138*** -0.030 0.295** 0.061 0.059
(0.135) (0.045) (0.075) (0.135) (0.052) (0.080)
R&D department -0.199 -0.044 0.091 -0.202 0.008 0.164**
(0.139) (0.050) (0.071) (0.139) (0.058) (0.080)
Small firms 0.642*** -0.116*** -0.044 0.615*** -0.067 0.063
(0.145) (0.044) (0.079) (0.146) (0.050) (0.089)
Medium firms 0.756*** -0.036 -0.166** 0.742*** -0.037 -0.127
(0.191) (0.063) (0.082) (0.191) (0.070) (0.099)
Tech. park -0.147 0.016 -0.033 -0.151 0.036 0.123
(0.171) (0.058) (0.085) (0.170) (0.063) (0.096)
Tech. platform 0.019 0.047 0.154** 0.017 0.272*** 0.276***
(0.152) (0.052) (0.076) (0.152) (0.064) (0.075)
Transparent evaluation procedures 0.310** 0.377***
(0.131) (0.126)
Adequate networks of potential 
partners 0.385*** 0.372**
(0.143) (0.145)
Adequate marketing of
programmes -0.585*** -0.643***
(0.157) (0.153)
Constant -2.094*** 0.109 0.320** -2.099*** 0.161** 0.594***
(0.279) (0.067) (0.139) (0.281) (0.079) (0.162)
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Industry and country dummies are 
included but not reported. 
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